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Against Fregean Quantification⇤
Bryan Pickel and Brian Rabern
[Frege] resolved, for the first time in the whole
history of logic, the problem which had foiled
the most penetrating minds that had given their
attention to the subject.
(Dummett 1973: 8)
Abstract
There are two dominant approaches to quantification: the Fregean and the Tarskian.
While the Tarskian approach is standard and familiar, deep conceptual objections have
been pressed against its employment of variables as genuine syntactic and semantic
units. Because they do not explicitly rely on variables, Fregean approaches are held to
avoid these worries. The apparent result is that the Fregean can deliver something that
the Tarskian is unable to, namely a compositional semantic treatment of quantification
centered on truth and reference. We argue that the Fregean approach faces the same
choice: abandon compositionality or abandon the centrality of truth and reference to
semantic theory. Indeed, we argue that developing a fully compositional semantics
in the tradition of Frege leads to a typographic variant of the most radical of Tarskian
views: variabilism, the view that names should be modeled as Tarskian variables. We
conclude with the consequences of this result for Frege’s distinction between sense
and reference.
A central achievement of early analytic philosophy was the development of a formal
language capable of representing the logic of the quantifiers. There are two dominant
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approaches to quantification: the Fregean and the Tarskian. Fregeans generalize the se-
mantics of quantification from the semantics of atomic sentences and sentences composed
with truth-functional connectives. This approach is widely held to be more philosophically
satisfactory because the Fregean allegedly preserves the standard referential semantics for
names and retains truth (or propositional content) as the central notion in a compositional
semantic theory. By way of contrast, the Tarskian alternative, though mathematically ele-
gant, abandons either compositionality or the centrality of truth and reference in semantic
theory. For example, in comparing the Fregean and Tarskian approaches, Evans says:
. . . [T]he Fregean theory with its direct recursion on truth is very much simpler and
smoother than the Tarskian alternative, whose mechanism of infinite sequences dif-
fering in at most this or that place is dispensed with. But its interest does not stem
from this, but rather from examination at a more philosophical level. It seems to me
that serious exception can be taken to the Tarskian theory on the ground that it loses
sight of, or takes no account of, the centrality of sentences (and of truth) in the theory
of meaning. (Evans 1977: 476)
The central fault of the Tarskian approach is claimed to be its incorporation of variables to
construct open sentences.1 These open sentences are not true or false absolutely and so
displace truth as the central notion in the theory of meaning.
We argue that the Fregean approach faces the same choice: abandon compositionality
or abandon the centrality of truth and reference to semantic theory. Indeed, we argue that
developing a fully compositional semantics in the tradition of Frege leads to a typographic
variant of the most radical of Tarskian views: variabilism, the view that names should be
1The so-called “antinomy of the variable” appeals to conflicting pressures to say of two distinct variables
x and y that they are semantically alike but also that they are semantically di↵erent. See Fine (2003) (cf.
Jacobson 1999: 127) and Pickel & Rabern (2016) for extended discussion. While the antinomy of the variable
per se is not our primary concern here our thesis casts doubt on the claim than the Fregean is better placed
than the Tarskian to address the antinomy.
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modeled as Tarskian variables. We conclude with the consequences of this result for
Frege’s distinction between sense and reference.
1 The Base Language
Can Fregeans o↵er a theory of quantification that naturally extends the semantics of the
non-quantified portion of the language? In particular, can they o↵er a semantic theory that
takes reference and truth as the central notions of the semantic theory? In this section, we
describe the syntax and semantics for the non-quantified portion of the language that is
common between Frege and Tarski. In the next section, we examine how Tarski modifies
this picture—abandoning either the centrality of reference and truth or compositionality—
in his e↵ort to o↵er a semantics for quantification. We then examine Fregean attempts to
o↵er a semantics for quantification which preserves the semantics assigned to the non-
quantified portion of the language.
Frege and Tarski each o↵er a truth-theory for the sentences of a language. Tarski’s
theory entails a sentence of the form pS is true if and only if  q, for each sentence S of
the language (Tarski 1935). Tarski himself thought that a theory yielding entailments of
this kind would provide a satisfactory account of truth. In contemporary semantics—in
both the Davidsionian (Larson & Segal 1995) and Montagovian (Heim & Kratzer 1998)
traditions—a theory of this kind is said to act as a theory of meaning for the language. A
Fregean semantic theory characterizes a function, J.K, which assigns a denotation (Bedeu-
tung) to every expression of the language. Frege’s truth theory specifies when a sentence
of the language denotes the True (Frege 1893/2013). The truth conditions of a sentence
depend on the denotations of the expressions from which it is syntactically derived.
A semantic theory requires a structural description of every sentence in the language. A
language contains a set of basic expressions. A derived expression—including a sentence—
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results from the application of a syntactic construction rule to more basic expressions. For
example, a conjunction such as (3) below is syntactically derived by applying a construction
rule to its two conjuncts (1) and (2), which in turn syntactically derive from applying the
predication construction rule to the names and predicates that make them up.
(1) Annabel smiles.
(2) Hazel waves.
(3) Annabel smiles and Hazel waves.
How we describe these syntactic construction rules depends on how we think of the com-
plex expressions. For example, a complex expression might be treated as a string of basic
expressions, where the conjunction rule puts the word ‘and’ between the two sentences
it applies to and the predication rule juxtaposes a name and a predicate. Or a complex
expression might instead be treated as a tree, where the rules map expressions to tree
structures consisting of the input expressions. There may also be rules (“transformation
rules”) that manipulate strings or trees in more complex ways, for instance by deleting
or replacing all occurrences of a certain expression (see Chomsky 1957). If complex ex-
pressions are treated as something besides trees or strings of basic expressions, say Gödel
numbers, then the various syntactic construction rules di↵er, for example, they may be
arithmetic operations. As we will see, these more complicated syntactic construction rules
appear in Frege’s syntax for quantification.
The structural description of the quantifier free portion of the language (which we will
call the base language) can be generated by an initial lexicon and three syntactic construc-
tion rules. The lexicon includes terms and predicates.2 Terms include denumerably many
2To simplify discussion we ignore function letters and complex singular terms, which Pickel (2010) argues
cause additional di culties for Fregean syntax.
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lower case letters for names from the beginning of the alphabet (a, b, c,. . . ). The predicates,
with adicity marked by the superscript n, include denumerably many upper case letters
(Fn,Gn,Hn,. . . ). The syntactic construction rules are as follows.
⇢: Takes an n-place predicate ⇡ and n terms, ↵1, . . . ,↵n, and yields a sentence. We
represent this sentence as p⇡↵1 . . .↵nq.
¬: Takes a sentence   and yields a sentence. We represent this sentence as p¬ q.
^: Takes a pair of sentences   and  and yields a sentence. We represent this sentence
as p(  ^  )q.
Nothing else is a sentence of the language. Note that instances of p⇡↵1 . . .↵nq, p¬ q,
or p(  ^  )q are metalanguage descriptions of object language expressions rather than
object language expressions themselves. In particular, they describe a formula as the
result of applying the operations of predication, negation, and conjunction to more basic
expressions.3
The principle of compositionality relates the semantic contribution of a derived ex-
pression to the semantic contribution of the simpler expressions from which it is derived.
Namely, if two expressions are derived by applying the same syntactic formation rule to a
sequence of co-denoting expressions, then the derived expressions themselves co-denote.
The compositionality principle can be formally stated as follows, where ⌘ is a syntactic
rule for deriving a complex expression from more basic expressions.
3 The point of this convention will become apparent later in connection with Frege’s syntax. To cut down
on quotation marks we also employ the convention that atomic expressions can be used to refer to themselves.
Given these conventions on the metalanguage and on use/mention, a and b are names, F is a predicate, and
Fab is a formula. Note that ⇢(F, a, b) is a formula, and in fact ⇢(F, a, b) = Fab. But pFabq is not a formula, instead
it refers to one – pFabq is a metalanguage description of an object language formula, namely ⇢(F, a, b); likewise
¬(⇢(F, a, b)) is a formula and p¬Fabq refers to it; ^(¬(⇢(F, a, b)),⇢(G, b, b)) is a formula and p(¬Fab^Gbb)q refers
to it. The same convention applies when quantification and abstraction are introduced, so, e.g., 8(x,Fxb) is
a formula referred to by p8xFxbq, ⇤(x,Fxb) is a predicate referred to by px̂Fxbq, and  (a,Fab) is a predicate
referred to by pâFabq, and so on.
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compositionality:
If ↵ = ⌘( 1,. . . , n) and   = ⌘( 1,. . . ,  n), then if J iK = J iK (for all i), then J↵K = J K.
This is the standard notion of semantic composition used in linguistic semantics in the
tradition of Montague (cf. Pagin & Westerståhl 2010).4 But compositionality has its roots
in Frege. Because of its historical roots, it has even been referred to as “Frege’s Principle”
(Carnap 1947: 121; Cresswell 1973: 76).5
The truth conditions for the base language can be specified in a way that respects
compositionality. The denotation of a term ↵ is its referent, J↵K. The denotation of an n-
predicate ⇡ is its extension J⇡K, which is a set of n-tuples. The semantic values of complex
sentences can be specified as follows.
Predication Rule: J⇡↵1 . . .↵nK =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if hJ↵1K, . . . , J↵nKi 2 J⇡K
False, otherwise
Negation Rule: J¬ K =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if J K = False
False, if J K = True
Conjunction Rule: J(  ^  )K =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if J K = True = J K
False, otherwise.
Thus, (1) ‘Annabel smiles’ is true just in case the referent of ‘Annabel’ is in the extension of
‘smiles’ and (2) ‘Hazel waves’ is true just in case the referent of ‘Hazel’ is in the extension
4See Montague (1970), Montague (1973), Lewis (1970), Dowty et al. (1981). For discussion see Partee (1984)
and Hodges (2001). Compositionality can be stated equivalently given standard assumptions (cf. Pagin &
Westerståhl 2010) as the principle that the denotation of a complex expression is the result of applying a
function to the denotations of the expressions from which it syntactically derives: For every syntactic rule ⌘
there is a semantic operation f⌘ such that J⌘(↵1, . . .↵n)K = f⌘(J↵1K, . . . , J↵nK).
5Frege says: “the truth value of a sentence remains unchanged when an expression is replaced by another
having the same reference” (Frege 1892/1960: 64). Frege’s specific commitments on compositionality, espe-
cially in connection to the context principle, remain a matter of dispute (see Janssen 2001, Pelletier 2001, and
references therein; including classic discussions in Dummett 1973).
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of ‘waves’. The conjunction (3) is true if and only if ‘Annabel smiles’ is true and ‘Hazel
waves’ is true.
In this semantics, each sentence is assigned a truth-value as its denotation. So, truth
plays a central role in theory of meaning, as Evans says above.
truth centrality: The denotation of a sentence is a possible argument for a truth
function. Therefore, the denotation of a sentence is its truth-value.
The contribution a sentence makes to the truth conditions of sentences that contain it is
just its truth-value.
The contribution of a term is also just its referent. Two terms that co-refer make the
same contribution to the truth conditions of sentences that contain them. In this respect,
the notion of reference—the link between a word and what it picks out in the world—is
also central to the theory of meaning.6
reference centrality: The denotation of a term is fit to be in the extension of a
predicate. Therefore, the denotation of a term is an object, its referent.
Thus, the semantics for this base language is compositional and is fundamentally con-
strained by the assignments of truth and reference to sentences and terms.
2 The Tarskian Theory
The challenge is to compositionally extend the semantics of the base language to cover
quantification while preserving truth and reference centrality. We now examine
Tarski’s semantics for quantification in order to develop the complaint that it is either
non-compositional or that it abandons truth and reference centrality.7
6Of course, for Frege a sentence has a truth-value as its referent, e.g., Frege (1891/1997: 137).
7The basic style of approach goes back to Tarski (1935), and was refined in later works such as Tarski
& Vaught (1957). See Hodges (2014) for an overview. There are many textbooks that follow the Tarskian
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To account for quantification, Tarski must first extend the syntax of the language.
Consider a sentence such as ‘everything smiles and waves’. The sentence is constructed
by applying a syntactic rule connecting the quantifier ‘everything’ to ‘smiles and waves’.
Because Tarski (1935) treats ‘and’ as a sentential connective, it occurs between two expres-
sions of the same syntactic type as sentences in his formal correlate of ‘smiles and waves’.
So Tarski needs to construct sentences in his formal language that can be conjoined. Tarski
extends the lexicon to include explicit variables (x, y, z,. . . ). These variables are terms
insofar as they occupy the same syntactic positions as proper names. Thus, ‘x smiles’ and
‘x waves’ are both of the same syntactic type as sentences. We call everything of this type
a sentence and refer to an expression of sentence type containing free variables as an open
sentence.
Open sentences play a key role in constructing quantified sentences in Tarski’s lan-
guage. The open sentences ‘x smiles’ and ‘x waves’ may be conjoined to yield the open
sentence ‘x smiles and x waves’. A quantified sentence is constructed from a variable and
an open sentence by the following construction rule.
8: Takes a variable ⌫ and a sentence   and yields a sentence. We represent this sentence
as p8⌫ q.
Thus, ‘x smiles and x waves’ may be fed into the quantification rule to yield sentence (4).
(4) Everythingx is such that x smiles and x waves.
In (4), the universal quantifier ‘everythingx is such that’ functions as a sentential connective.
Sentence (4), or really 8x(Sx ^Wx), is Tarski’s formal correlate of ‘Everything smiles and
waves’.
approach including Tarski (1941), Hunter (1971), Machover (1996), Bergmann et al. (2009), Barker-Plummer
et al. (2011), etc., and including textbook introductions to natural language semantics such as Heim & Kratzer
(1998).
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Appealing to these syntactic descriptions, Tarskians have o↵ered two sorts of recur-
sive theory for characterizing the truth conditions for quantified sentences in terms of the
denotations of the expressions they derive from. One sort of theory—developed in Tarski
(1935)—can be construed as preserving truth and reference centrality but violating
compositionality, and this has been the source of the persistent claim that Tarski’s seman-
tic theory is not compositional (Salmon 2006b; Partee 2013; Soames 2010, 64 footnote 9).
The other sort of theory—also developed by Tarski and his students8—is compositional,
but abandons the centrality of both truth and reference, leading to complaints of the sort
raised by Evans. We examine each proposal in turn.9
2.1 Assignment-Relative Semantics
The problem for the Tarskian theory arises from its commitment to explicit variables and
open sentences in the syntax. Although variables and proper names are of the same
syntactic type, terms, their semantic contribution is very di↵erent. Whereas a name refers
to a particular object, a variable picks out di↵erent objects relative to di↵erent assignments.
For any assignment  , let J.K  be a function that takes an expression to its denotation on
that assignment. The denotation of a constant is the same object, its referent, for any
assignment. The value of a variable depends on the assignment  .
Terms:
Constant: If ↵ is a name, then J↵K  = the referent of ↵
8See Janssen (1997) and Hodges (2014). This is the approach that is connected to Tarksi’s algebraization of
first-order logic. See Monk (1976: 219-230) and Henkin et al. (1971) on cylindrical algebras.
9One can easily re-construe what we say here in terms of the standard models M = hD,Vi, where D is
the domain and V assigns appropriate values to the n-place predicates and names. Note that Tarski’s earlier
semantics in, e.g., Tarski (1935) is more in line with the way presented here, whereas the more standard
presentation occurs later, perhaps most explicitly in Tarski & Vaught (1957). See discussion in Etchemendy
(1988a) and Hodges (2014). We discuss model-theoretic approaches more explicitly in §4, especially in
connection with Mates (1965) and with Wehmeier’s (2018) model-theoretic construal of Fregean semantics.
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Variable: If ⌫ is a variable, then J⌫K  =  (⌫)
Similarly, an open sentence such as ‘x smiles’ is not true or false absolutely. The open
sentence is satisfied by (or true relative to) some assignments and unsatisfied by (or false
relative to) others. For example, ‘x smiles’ is only satisfied by those assignment functions
that assign the variable x to a smiling individual. Thus, satisfaction by (or truth relative
to) an assignment for atomic predication is defined as follows (where J⇡K  is the extension
of the predicate ⇡):
Predication Rule: J⇡↵1 . . .↵nK  =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if hJ↵1K , . . . , J↵nK i 2 J⇡K 
False, otherwise
The truth conditions of sentences constructed using truth-functional connectives are also
as they were in the base language.
Negation Rule: J¬ K  =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if J K  = False
False, if J K  = True
Conjunction Rule: J(  ^  )K  =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if J K  = True = J K 
False, otherwise.
So far, the semantic theory resembles exactly the semantic theory for the base language.
Moreover, the clauses are compositional since the semantic value of an expression at an
assignment is a function of its constituents’ semantic values at that same assignment.
However, compositionality fails when the language takes quantifiers into account.
The denotation of a quantified claim 8⌫  at an assignment   is not a function of the
denotations of the variable ⌫ and the sentence   at  . The denotation of 8⌫  at   depends
on the denotations of ⌫ and the sentence   at other assignments. If   is an assignment
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function and ⌫ is a variable, then let  [⌫/o] be the assignment that di↵ers from assignment
  at most in that it assigns o to ⌫. A universally quantified sentence 8⌫  is satisfied by an
assignment   if for every object o,  [⌫/o] satisfies  .
Quantification Rule: J8⌫ K  =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if for all o, J K [⌫/o] = True
False, otherwise.
A sentence is true (simpliciter) if it is satisfied by every assignment. Thus, (4) is true if and
only if the embedded open sentence ‘x smiles and x waves’ is satisfied by every assignment
function.
On this semantics, J.K  assigns each expression to its denotation. The function J.K 
satisfies truth and reference centrality. As a consequence, it violates compositonality.
To see this, consider quantified formulae that are constructed by application of the same
syntactic rule, such as 8xRxy and 8xRyx:
8xRxy = 8(x,Rxy)
8xRyx = 8(x,Ryx)
Assume that x and y co-denote relative to assignment  . By compositionality, it follows
that JRxyK  = JRyxK . Again by compositionality, it follows that J8xRxyK  = J8xRyxK .10
But these formulae aren’t equivalent: everything might stand in a relation R to object
o without o standing in R to everything. This shows that the function J.K  does not
compositionally assign expressions to their denotations. This argument is fully general.
Any denotation function J.K⇤ that preserves truth and reference centrality for this
language and yields J8xRxyK⇤ , J8xRyxK⇤ results in failures of compositionality.
10Or look at it in terms of the functional understanding of compositonality. For quantification we have
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compositionality is a core methodological constraint on semantic theorizing (see Par-
tee 1984 and Dever 1999). Abandoning it would require revisiting every choice that it has
previously motivated. It also has empirical content, explaining how a language user can
understand an infinity of complex expressions by understanding a finite base of simple
expressions and rules for forming complex expressions out of simpler expressions (see,
e.g., Heim & Kratzer 1998).
This failure of compositionality does not exclusively rely on truth and reference
centrality, which one may take to involve overly narrow conceptions of the semantic
contributions of a sentence and term. It extends, for example, to those who think that the
primary semantic function of a sentence is to express a content, a possible worlds intension
or a structured Russellian or Fregean proposition. The problem would arise for any view
on which two open sentences have the same denotation (relative to an assignment) but
di↵er by the substitution of variables or by the substitution of a variable for a singular
term.11 Retaining compositionality would require abandoning this assumption. But
many have worried that such a view “demotes” propositions to “secondary importance
in semantics” because the contribution that a sentence makes to the truth-conditons of a
sentence that contains it is not the proposition it expresses (King 2003: 200).12
11A background assumption here is that truth-values are just the True and the False. In particular, it is
assumed that a truth-value is not a function from assignments to {the True, the False} – and more generally a
truth-condition (or proposition) is not a function on assignments. Likewise, it is assumed that the referent of
“Gottlob” is a man, not a function from assignments to men. If truth-values and reference were re-construed
so they were functions on assignments, then, of course, the core tension would dissolve. One can make any
system that is compositional in terms of intensions compositional in terms of “extension” so long as one is
willing to re-construe the “intensions” as the “extensions” (see Lewis 1974).
12For recent advocates of propositional centrality see King (2003), Scha↵er (2021), and Glanzberg & King
(2020). Others have argued that compositional semantics must displace content for semantic value (Lewis
1980), see e.g. Ninan (2010), Rabern (2012; 2017), Recanati (2018), and references therein. King (2007:
Appendix) attempts to o↵er a theory of quantification that incorporates elements of the Fregean view discussed
below in order to (i) guarantee that propositions have semantic primacy and (ii) deliver compositionality. Yet,
Yli-Vakkuri (2013) convincingly argues that King’s approach is not compositional for reasons similar to those
we o↵er to show that the centrality of truth is incompatible with compositionality. See also Rabern (2013),
Pickel & Rabern (2016), and Pickel & Rabern (2021).
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2.2 Assignment-Sensitive Semantics
As developed above, the Tarskian semantics is not compositional. However, a composi-
tional theory can be provided for the Tarskian account with a shift of perspective. Instead
of construing denotations as assignment relative, make denotations assignment sensitive.
In this way the denotation of a term is something other than its referent (at an assignment),
namely a function from an assignment to an object. In particular a variable ⌫ denotes the
function from assignment   to whatever   assigns to ⌫: J⌫K =   . (⌫). The denotation of a
name ↵ is a constant function from assignments to objects, e.g., for some o it may be that
J↵K =   .o. The denotation of an n-place predicate is an n-tuple of objects. With those
assumptions in place, the semantic clause for quantification can be given as follows.
J8⌫ K =   .
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if for all o, J K( [⌫/o]) = True
False, otherwise.
A semantic theory of this kind is compositional.13 But it obviously abandons the doctrines
that the denotation of a term is an object and the denotation of a sentence is a truth-value.
In this way the Tarskian has been shown to face the dilemma of having to either (i) abandon
compositionality or (ii) abandon truth and reference centrality.
Therefore, in order to preserve compositionality, the Tarskian must make rather se-
vere adjustments to the semantic clauses for the base language. For example, in the base
13 Actually to ensure genuine compositional compliance the last clause requires a small amendment. We
should only appeal to the semantic value of a variable x, namely JxK, instead of the variable x itself. This is easily
remedied. To do so we introduce the function #, which maps the semantic value of a variable to the variable
itself. In particular, #J⌫K = the variable ↵ such that J↵K( ) =  (⌫) for any assignment  . Since for any variables
↵ and  , if ↵ ,  , then J↵K , J K, # is well-defined, and will have the result that for any variable ⌫, #J⌫K = ⌫.
See Zimmermann and Sternefeld (2013: 242) for extended discussion of this trick, which will be required by
fully compositional implementations of Frege-inspired approaches as well. With this complication in place
we can specify the fully compositional clause as follows:
J8⌫ K = f8(J⌫K, J K) =   .
8>><>>:




semantics, one might be tempted to view proper names as making word-world connec-
tions. The job of a proper name is to stand for its referent. A sentence containing a proper
name says something about this referent. The function of a variable, on the other hand, is
partly given by its role in bound constructions. A bound variable does not contribute an
object which the remainder of the sentence says something about. Rather, it interacts in a
distinctive way with antecedent quantifiers.
In the compositional version of the Tarskian semantics, neither variables nor proper
names denote their referents. Rather, they denote functions from assignments to individ-
uals. The distinction between proper names and variables can be preserved by holding
that proper names denote constant functions but the function denoted by a variable may
have di↵erent values for di↵erent arguments.14 Thus, variables may be non-vacuously
bound whereas for proper names – even if they could be bound – the binding would be
vacuous.
However, some hold that even this distinction is artificial from the perspective of com-
positional semantics. According to variabilism about names, the denotation of a proper
name—like the denotation of a variable—may yield di↵erent values for di↵erent assign-
ment functions. Indeed, most variabilists would argue that even proper names may be
bound in natural language and that it would be appropriate to provide a regimentation
that allows for this sort of binding. They therefore propose that proper names in natural
language should be regimented using Tarskian variables.15
14Compare to Salmon’s (2006a) discussion of proper names as “invariable variables”.
15See, for example, Yagisawa (1984), Dever (1998), Cumming (2008), Santorio (2012), Schoubye (2017; 2020),
and Rabern (2021).
14
3 The Fregean Alternatives
The failure of compositionality or of truth and reference centrality endemic to the
Tarskian semantics might seem to originate from the appeal to variables as genuine syn-
tactic units. The Fregean approach has been held to evade these worries. Fregeans insist
that the only “variables” that appear in their formalisms are mere marks of punctuation
or are even completely eliminable. In avoiding variables and open sentences, the Fregean
claims to o↵er a compositional semantic theory centered on truth and reference. In ad-
dition to Evans (1977), theorists such as Dummett (1973), Cresswell (1973), Partee (2013),
Heck (2012), Smith (2017), Wehmeier (2018, 2021), Potter (2020), and Button & Walsh (2018)
have each suggested that some aspect of the Fregean account frees it from the di culties
faced by the Tarskian.
Frege regimented quantified sentences of natural language into his formal language,
the Begri↵sschrift, which contained explicit construction rules for syntactically deriving
sentences including quantified formulae. The syntactic formation and semantic evaluation
rules for this language are most clearly presented in Basic Laws §30 (Frege 1893/2013).
These rules look very di↵erent from the contemporary Tarskian approach. Dummett
illustrates the syntactic derivation of a Fregean quantified sentence using the natural
language sentence ‘everybody envies somebody’ as follows.16 We add labels A, B, and C
to the steps in order to aid exposition.
[A] we begin with a sentence such as ‘Peter envies John’. [B] From this we form the one-
place predicate ‘Peter envies ⇠’ by removing the proper name ‘John’ – the Greek letter
‘⇠’ here serving merely to indicate where the gap occurs that is left by the removal of
the proper name. [C] This predicate can then be combined with the sign of generality
16The natural language sentence ‘everybody envies somebody’ is ambiguous. However, this ambiguity is
not important for the main point that Dummett is illustrating. The corresponding formula of Begri↵sschrift is
unambiguous.
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‘somebody’ to yield the sentence ‘Peter envies somebody’. The resulting sentences
may now be subjected to the same process: by removing the proper name ‘Peter’, we
obtain the predicate ‘⇠ envies somebody’, and this may then be combined with the
sign of generality ‘everybody’ to yield the sentence ‘Everybody envies somebody’.
(Dummett 1973: 11)
There are three features of the Fregean syntax for predicate logic that—it might be hoped—
aid in avoiding the dilemma.
F1. Quantifiers are predicates of predicates. The Tarskian syntax treats a quantified
formula as derived from applying the construction rule for the quantifier to the
variable x and the formula  . The Fregean derives a quantified formula by applying
the construction rule for the quantifier to a predicate  (⇠). (Step [C] above.)
F2. Quantified formulae are derived from names and closed sentences. The Tarskian
syntax treats quantified sentences (or complex predicates) as ultimately constructed
from open sentences which contain variables. The Fregean syntax first constructs a
closed sentence and a name. It then constructs the quantified sentence (or complex
predicate) by the application of a syntactic rule to the name and the closed sentence.
(Step [A] to [B] above.)
F3. Alphabetic variants are identical. The standard Tarskian syntax does not identify
alphabetic variants. Thus the sentence 8xRxa is distinct from the sentence 8yRya
and the complex predicate x̂Rxa is distinct from the complex predicate ŷRya. In
contrast, the Fregean syntactically identifies the complex predicate that results from
removing b from Rba with the complex predicate that results from removing c from
Rca. The Fregean identifies this complex predicate as an expression containing a
“gap”: ‘R a’. Or using Frege’s gap-markers, ‘R⇠a’. (Step [B] above.) This type
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of approach has been extended by more recent proponents who appeal to Quine-
Bourbaki diagrams in order to render a quantified formulae such as8x9y(Ryx!Rxy)
as follows (adapted from Kaplan (1986: 244)):
89(R ! R )
In the remainder of this section we examine each feature in detail spelling out why
it has been held to be advantageous. We argue that these contrasts are individually
and collectively insu cient to exculpate Fregean approaches from the charges against
the Tarskian approach. We examine proposals that in one way or another take up a
Fregean approach to quantification. Our contention is that when Fregean approaches
are spelled out precisely they end up having the same alleged vices as the Tarskian
account. They either end up violating the compositionality principle or they demote
truth and reference from their central role in the semantic theory. Moreover, we argue
that compositional versions of the Fregean approach are variabilist in the sense discussed
above: a single category of expression both regiments proper names and plays the role of
Tarskian variables in the derivation and semantic evaluation of quantified sentences.
3.1 Quantifiers as predicates of predicates
On standard presentations, the Tarskian quantifier, ‘8x’, serves a double-duty: it both
binds variables in its scope and it generalizes. The truth-value of a quantified formula 8x 
relative to an assignment   depends on the truth-value of the embedded formula  relative
to assignments that di↵er from   only in their interpretation of x. The quantified formula
is true if and only if the embedded formula is true on all assignments. The contribution of
the quantifier to the truth conditions of a sentence that contains it is obscured by serving
these two roles.
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According to Fregean approaches, a quantifier has a single semantic role of generalizing
a predicate (feature F1). A sentence that results from applying the universal quantifier
‘everything’ to a predicate is true if and only if the predicate is true of every object and a
sentence that results from applying the existential quantifier ‘something’ to a predicate is
true if and only if the predicate is true of some object.
(5) Everything smiles.
(6) Something waves.
Thus, (5) is true if everything smiles and (6) is true if something waves.
There are two reasons one might view the Fregean approach as preserving compo-
sitionality in contrast to the Tarskian. The first is that the Fregean explicitly assigns a
meaning to the quantifier symbol ‘8’. This position is articulated by Partee (2013: 120-121),
who says that Frege’s development of predicate logic was carried out “more composition-
ally” than Tarski’s, where “the quantifier symbols 8 and 9 are not themselves given a
semantic interpretation”. Indeed, Frege provides a denotation for his quantifier symbol
‘ a . . . a . . .’. Or, rather, Frege provides the same denotation for his many synonymous
quantifier symbols, each indexed by a di↵erent Gothic letter. (Looking ahead to feature
F3, we will ignore this feature of Frege’s syntax).17 However, as we have seen, nothing
prevents the Tarskian from assigning a meaning to the quantifier expressions as well.
Therefore, we turn to the second potential advantage: variables are not immediate
constituents of quantified formulae. Along these lines, Cresswell (1973: 80-87) cites the
familiar di culty in accounting for the semantic di↵erence between 8xFx and 8xFy, if x
17If the Gothic letters are ordered, Frege could get by with a single syntactic formation rule for quantification.
There is some evidence for this in (Frege (1893/2013), §8, Rule 2), where Frege describes the procedure for
generating a quantified formula from a complex predicate, saying that if in  (⇠) an argument place is in the
scope of a concavity with a given German letter a, then for the resulting sentence a distinct German letter
(perhaps e) must decorate the new concavity.
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and y happen to share their referent. Cresswell insists that by treating the quantifier as
attaching to a complex predicate which is constructed by abstraction, one can then treat the
quantifiers as straightforward predicates of predicates, and thereby avoid the problems
that plague the standard syntax.
Yet there remains a major lacuna in the semantics. Not every quantified statement
results from applying a quantifier phrase to a simple predicate.18 Consider (7).
(7) Something smiles and waves.
This sentence results from applying the quantifier ‘Something’ to the predicate ‘smiles and
waves’. But this latter predicate cannot be a simple predicate. In particular, we want to be
able to explain the fact that (7) entails (6) and (8).
(6) Something waves.
(8) Something smiles.
To deliver this explanation, the predicate ‘smiles and waves’ must be syntactically derived
from the simpler predicates ‘smiles’ and ‘waves’. The central challenge to the Fregean
approach, then, is to provide a compositional account of the formation and semantic
evaluation rules for these syntactically derived predicates.
Contemporary semanticists follow Frege by constructing quantified formulae using
two formation rules: one derives a complex predicate x̂  (or  x ) from a variable x and
an open sentence   and the other attaches the quantifier to the complex predicate.19
18The problem is acute for sentences containing multiple quantifiers such as ‘everyone loves someone’,
which does not result from applying the quantifier phrase ‘someone’ to a simple predicate. The quantifier
applies to the complex predicate ‘being such that everyoney is such that theyy love them’.
19See, e.g., Lewis (1970): 43↵ ; but also Church (1932), Montague (1970), Cresswell (1973), and Stalnaker
(1977). This is standard in connection with generalized quantifier theory, e.g., Barwise & Cooper (1981)
implement quantified NPs as sets of sets and include an abstraction operator that combines with a formula
to form a set term. For a textbook discussion, see Heim & Kratzer (1998: 189-190).
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⇤: Takes a variable ⌫ and a sentence   and yields a monadic predicate. We represent
this predicate as p⌫̂ q.
⇧: Takes a monadic predicate ⇡ and yields a sentence. We represent this sentence as
p8⇡q.
The first step corresponds to the binding work (predicate abstraction, or “lambda bind-
ing”), while the second corresponds to the quantificational work. Visually one can compare
the standard Tarskian syntax on the left with this Fregean departure on the right:
8x   8 x̂  
A quantified formula 8x̂  is true on this approach if the embedded predicate x̂  is true of
all objects.
The challenge for the Fregean in implementing this proposal is to semantically char-
acterize complex predicates in terms of the expressions from which they derive. In con-
temporary formal semantics, this problem is relocated to the semantics of abstraction.




If the terms x and y co-denote, then JRxyK = JRyxK, and so it follows—by compositional-
ity—that Jx̂RxyK = Jx̂RyxK. But, of course, these predicate abstracts should denote distinct
properties, the properties of being an x that stands in R to y and being an x that y stands in
R to, respectively. So separating quantification from abstraction is no advance in terms of
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violations of compositionality. Abstraction does not save compositionality – it instead
locates precisely where it fails (given the Fregean assumptions).20
We can, however, provide a compositional semantics for this syntax by again making
anti-Fregean assumptions about denotation. We replace the semantic clause for quantifi-
cation with the following two clauses:21
Abstraction Rule: J⌫̂ K = f⇤(J⌫K, J K) =   . o.J K( [⌫/o])
Quantification Rule: J8⇡K = f⇧(J⇡K) =   .
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if for all o, J⇡K(o) = True
False, otherwise.
While an approach that employs abstraction may be advantageous in terms of providing
an explicit meaning to the quantifier, the approach described here clearly does not avoid
the dilemma because it relies on the assumption that the denotation of a variable is a
function from assignments to objects and the denotation of a sentence is a function from
assignments to truth-values.
3.2 Recursion on names and closed sentences
An apparently distinctive feature of Fregean syntax is its avoidance of “open” sentences
and variables. Whereas the Tarskian syntax constructs quantified sentences from open
sentences which contain variables, the Fregean syntax first constructs a closed sentence,
20Note that Cresswell’s (1973) argument (pp. 80-87) concerning the non-compositionality of
heveryone, x, hsleeps, xii can be reproduced in his lambda-categorial language by considering lambda terms
such as h , x, hloves, x,Arabellaii and h , x, hloves, y,Arabellaii. This leads to a violation of Frege’s Principle
(as defined on Cresswell’s p. 76), but Cresswell, somewhat surprisingly, never revisits the compositionality
principle in connection with the lambda-categorial language.
21See Lewis (1970: 44-45) and Montague (1970). And see Rabern (2013: 398-400) for discussion. See also
Kobele (2010) in connection with natural language syntax-semantics interface.
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then constructs a predicate by a process of name removal, and finally combines the result-
ing predicate with a quantifier. This is feature F2 of Frege’s program. We argue that direct
recursion on names and closed formulae in this manner forces the same uncomfortable
choice faced by Tarski.
Syntactically, Fregean approaches defined by F2 di↵er from the Tarskian approach in
two respects: (i) the language includes only terms drawn from the beginning of the Latin
alphabet a, b, c,. . . rather than additionally containing terms from the end of the alphabet
x, y, z. . . and (ii) the abstraction rule is replaced with the following rule:22
 : Takes a name ↵ and a sentence   and yields a monadic predicate. We represent this
predicate as p↵̂ q.
Rule   di↵ers from rule ⇤ only by appealing to letters at the beginning rather than end of
the alphabet. And, of course, merely avoiding the use of lower case letters from the end
of the alphabet cannot in itself be advance on the Tarskian approach. Nothing prohibits
using the beginning of the alphabet for variables. This choice of alphabetic location is
arbitrary.
But the Fregean doesn’t just avoid use of certain parts of the alphabet, they use the
same set of terms—the names—to regiment ordinary proper names and to derive complex
predicates or quantified formulae. In contrast, a textbook Tarskian system (e.g. Kalish
& Montague 1964) has two syntactic species within a broader genus of terms—names
and variables—and the category of names regiments proper names of ordinary language,
while the category of variables are used to derive quantified formulae. For the Fregean,
22Recall the convention introduced above (see footnote 3) that an instance of p↵̂ q is a metalanguage
descriptions of an object language expression rather than an object language expressions itself. So, for
example, ‘âRab’ and ‘ĉRcb’ are metalanguage descriptions of object language predicates, whereas âRab and
ĉRcb themselves are object language predicates, since  (a,Rab) = âRab and  (c,Rcb) = ĉRcb. For all we have
said it could even be that âRab = ĉRcb – this identification of “alphabetic variants” is explicitly considered in
the next section.
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all terms are names, but names enter into the construction rules in two di↵erent ways.
The use of a unified category of terms rather than a bifurcated category does not
interestingly di↵erentiate the Fregean from the Tarskian approach. In fact, using two
categories of terms is not essential to the the Tarskian approach—the languages defined
in, e.g., Tarski (1935) and Tarski & Vaught (1957) didn’t actually have a category of names
in addition to the variables. For us, the question of whether an expression is a variable
is tantamount to the question of whether it can play the role of variables in a quantified
sentence. That is, expressions that can be non-trivially bound by operators are variables.
The fact that an expression may also perform a di↵erent function while not bound is
irrelevant.
Our position regarding Frege’s syntax agrees with Carnap (1934/1959, §54), when
he considers the similar position that quantified sentences might be constructed using
constants rather than variables. (He attributes this possibility to Quine.) Thus, rather than
‘8x(x = x)’, one might have ‘80(0 = 0)’ or ‘83(3 = 3)’, where ‘0’ and ‘3’ are numerical
constants. Carnap argues that even if this language lacks free variables (because he treats
open sentences as having universal force), the proper names are nonetheless variable-
expressions, since they play the relevant role in the construction of quantified formulae.
F2 is a form of variabilism, names and variables constitute a unified semantic category.
It di↵ers from more recent forms of variablism only by using letters from the beginning of
the alphabet rather than the end to regiment names and variables.23 Both contemporary
and Fregean approaches use the same sort of expression to regiment (referential) proper
names and in the derivation of complex predicates or quantified sentences. Thus, there is
no interesting syntactic di↵erence between the Fregean who forms complex predicates by
applying a construction rule to names and closed sentences and the Tarskian who does so
23See, for example, Yagisawa (1984), Dever (1998), Cumming (2008), Pickel (2015), and Schoubye (2017;
2020).
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by applying a construction rule to variables and open sentences. The syntactic di↵erence
lies only in the alphabetic location of the “variables”.
If Fregeans want to o↵er a genuine alternative to the Tarskian approach, they must
o↵er a substantively di↵erent semantics for abstraction from that o↵ered by the Tarskian.
In particular, Fregeans must o↵er a semantics that evades the dilemma. But the only
compositional implementation of Frege’s idea gives up truth and reference centrality.
Suppose that the Fregean wishes to maintain truth and reference centrality. Con-
sider predicates that are constructed by applying the same syntactic rule, such as abstract-
ing the name a from Rab and Rba:
âRab =  (a,Rab)
âRba =  (a,Rba)
If the names a and b refer to the same object, then, by compositionality, it follows that
JRabK = JRbaK, and then again by compositionality it follows that JâRabK = JâRbaK. But, of
course, these predicate abstracts should denote distinct properties, the properties of being
an x that stands in R to b and being an x that b stands in R to, respectively. So, compositionality
fails for the Fregean approach.24 The appeal to letters from the beginning rather than the
end of the alphabet has in no way changed the underlying semantic picture.
Dummett (1973: 16-18) argued that there was “no real contrast” between the Tarskian
account of the formation of quantified sentences deploying variables and Frege’s account
that deploys names. Dummett’s reason is that
a free variable is treated exactly as if it were a proper name at every stage in the
24In other words, assume compositionality, and that JaK = JbK while JâRabK , JâRbaK. Then JRabK =
J⇢(R, a, b)K = f⇢(JRK, JaK, JbK) = f⇢(JRK, JbK, JaK) = J⇢(R, b, a)K = JRbaK, and so JâRabK = J (a,Rab)K =
f (JaK, JRabK) = f (JaK, JRbaK) = J (a,Rba)K = JâRbaK. Contradiction. See also Resnik (1986: 182) and Fine
(2003: 615).
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step-by-step construction of a given sentence up to that at which a quantifier is to be
prefixed which will bind that variable[.] (1973: 17)
To a certain extent, we agree with Dummett here. In both approaches, a quantified sentence
8xRxb is first formed by applying the predication rule ⇢ to a predicate and some terms.
The relevant complex predicate is then constructed by applying an abstraction rule, before
applying the quantification rule. Thus, the Tarskian and Fregean syntactic derivations are
structurally isomorphic.
Tarskian Derivation: ⇧(⇤(x,⇢(R, x, b)))
Fregean Derivation: ⇧( (a,⇢(R, a, b)))
Dummett (1981: 284-6), however, went on to argue that the Tarskian semantics gives up
the advantages of the Fregean approach, namely, that the denotation of a complex sentence
can be understood in terms of the truth conditions of the closed atomic sentences from
which it is derived. However, we think the equivalence goes the other way. Given that the
complex predicate âRab is derived from the name a and the sentence Rab, the denotation of
the name a must include more than its referent and the denotation of the sentence Rab must
include more than its truth-value (or truth-conditions). Otherwise, âRab will be identical
to âRba, should a and b happen to have the same denotation.
3.3 Identification of alphabetic variants
We now turn to the third, and final, element of Frege’s approach to quantification: F3. As
Dummett remarked, Frege’s syntactic rule removes or excludes a name such as ‘Annabel’
from a sentence such as ‘Annabel waves’, leaving a gap or mark of incompleteness ⇠.
The resulting predicate abstract can be written as ‘⇠ waves’. Removing a di↵erent name,
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‘Hazel’, from a corresponding sentence, ‘Hazel waves’, results in the same predicate ab-
stract, ‘⇠ waves’. Generalizing, if predicate abstract ⇡1 results from the application of the
removal operation   to a name ↵ and a sentence  ↵ and ⇡2 results from the application of
the removal operation   to a name   and a sentence    di↵ering from  ↵ only by the total
proper substitution of ↵ for  , then ⇡1 and ⇡2 are syntactically identical. On this view,
alphabetically-variant complex predicates are strictly and literally identical:
 (a,Rab) =  (c,Rcb)
So, contrary to a more standard syntax (§3.1), there are multiple ways to syntactically
derive one and the same complex predicate. The metaphor often used here is “removal”
of a name (or as Frege says “einen Eigennamen ausschließen”) from the sentence—the
names that contribute to their derivation do not show up in the finished product. This is
why the resulting predicate abstract ‘R b’ has a gap or mark of incompleteness.
 (a,Rab) = ‘R b’
 (c,Rcb) = ‘R b’
The name a doesn’t occur in the resulting predicate abstract ‘R b’, but it does figure in a
syntactic derivation of the predicate abstract.
For many formal languages one can read a syntactic derivation o↵ of the part-whole
structure of a derived expression. There is therefore a temptation to conflate the notions
of parthood and syntactic derivation. However, Frege’s rule for constructing complex
predicates is a transformation rule (in the sense of Chomsky 1957) requiring us to delete
all embedded occurrences of a name from the output string. One may specify this string
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as result of applying the construction rule   to a and Rab:  (a,Rab). Or, one may specify
this string intrinsically as a certain sequence of marks (e.g. ‘R b’, ‘R⇠b’, ‘R...b’, or ‘R•b’) or
as a Gödel number. But the latter is an issue for the science of calligraphy not logic.25
In Frege’s own semantics, there remains a hint of “variables” in the typography of
quantified formulae because these result from saturating a dispersed quantifier sign which
contains a Fraktur letter ‘ a . . . a . . .’ with a complex predicate such as ‘R⇠b’, yielding
‘ a Rab’. The apparent variable ‘a’ is not a genuine expression of the language but only
a typographic feature of the dispersed quantifier sign. Some have seen this as a sign
that variables—insofar as they show up in Frege’s approach to quantification—are mere
punctuation.
The advantages of Fregean over Tarskian predicate logic are due to the former’s
treating variables not as meaningful lexical items, but as mere marks of punctuation,
similar to parentheses. (Wehmeier 2018: 1)
It has been pointed out that even this modest appearance of variables is unnecessary, cf.
Potter (2020: 38). There is a tradition issuing independently from Quine and Bourbaki of
typographically writing quantified formulae without explicit variables at all (see Quine
(1940/1981: 69-70) and Bourbaki 1954).26 Rather than devices such as ‘a’ marking the
positions bound to the quantifier, this approach manually connects the bound positions
to the quantifier sign. Kaplan motivates the position as follows:
We need no variables. We could permit gaping formulas (as Frege would have had
25It seems to us that Wehmeier (2021) is misled by a conflation between the parts of a derived expression
(such as elements of a string) and the inputs to a syntactic derivation. For example, he insists that a syntactic
deletion rule (such as  ) is not a “syntactic mode of composition”, and he then draws semantic conclusions
from the insistence that gaps “are mere absences of syntactic material”. Similar remarks occur in Wehmeier
(2018).
26C.S. Peirce’s diagrammatic representation of quantificational logic in terms of “existential graphs” shares
this feature of linking argument positions with wires. See Peirce (1903), A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic,
pp. 15-23.
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it) and use wiring diagrams to link the quantifier to its gaps and to channel in values.
(Kaplan 1986: 244).
The suggestion is to render a quantified formula such as 8x9y(Ryx!Rxy) as the following
wire diagram:
89(R ! R )
This approach fully identifies alphabetic variant quantified formulae and not merely pred-
icate abstracts. This has been taken by many to be an ultimate vindication of the Fregean
approach.27
. . . if we adopt the Quine-Bourbaki notation, then we will not even be able to ask
whether typographically distinct variables like ‘x’ and ‘y’ have di↵erent ‘semantic
roles’ (Button & Walsh 2018: 14)
. . . variables could be completely eliminated from Fregean predicate logic in favor of
the graphical “bonds” once proposed by Quine as a means to indicate the dependence
of argument positions on outlying quantifiers (Wehmeier 2018: 215)
However, we see things di↵erently. Variables do not reside in the typographic pre-
sentation of quantified formulae or complex predicates, but in the syntactic derivations of
those quantified formulae or complex predicates. The identification of alphabetic variant
quantified formulae or complex predicates does nothing to relieve the tension between
truth and reference centrality and compositionality.
27The syntax of Bourbaki (1954) has a primitive “gap” symbol ⇤, alongside the other primitive symbols
such as negation, disjunction, and the Hilbert operator. Bourbaki understand formulae as strings of symbols
with links between the occurrences of symbols. Thus, a Bourbakian formulae could be construed as a string of
symbols paired with an equivalence relation on positions. Importantly for us, Bourbaki syntactically derive
quantified formulae (or epsilon terms) from a term and a formulae. See Mathias (2002) and Grimm (2013) for
discussion of Bourbaki’s syntax.
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In particular, Fregeans must still o↵er a syntactic derivation of quantified formulae
and complex predicates. For example, in the derivation of a quantified formula such as
8R b
the derivation of the complex predicate ‘R b’ still runs by way of applying a syntactic
operation   to a name and a sentence (e.g. a and Rab, or c and Rcb, or e and Reb, etc.). And
then ⇧ is applied to the result as follows:
⇧( (a,Rab)) = ‘8R b’
⇧( (c,Rcb)) = ‘8R b’
⇧( (e,Reb)) = ‘8R b’
. . .
For such an operation to be compositional, the name cannot denote its referent and the
sentence cannot denote its truth-value for all of the reasons we have already (perhaps
tediously) enumerated. The reasons are essentially the same as we saw in §3.2. The
syntactic identification of alphabetic variants doesn’t help. For example, the left-hand
sides of the following ought to be distinct, but their right-hand sides would be equivalent,










28Note that there is nothing to prohibit a Tarskian from also identifying alphabetic variant quantified
formulae or complex predicates. The Tarskian would syntactically derive a quantified formula such as 8xRxb
by applying the rule 8 to the variable x and the open sentence Rxb. The Tarskian then adds that the rule
8 is a transformation rule outputting the relevant variable-free string of marks so that the formula 8xRxb is
identical to the formula 8yRyb, which is derived by applying the rule 8 to an open sentence Ryb and y. Lewis
(1970: 45-6) proposed such a transformation rule to identify alphabetic variants. And this is now a standard












A critic might suggest that we are missing the significance of the identification of
alphabetic variants on the Fregean approach, because we wrongly suppose that compo-
sitionality requires that the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by the
semantic values of the expressions that occur in its derivation rather than by the semantic
values of its “parts”.29 We follow the standard characterization of compositionality, which
demands that the denotation of a derived expression is determined by the denotations of
the expressions from which it is syntactically derived (cf. Pagin & Westerståhl 2010). The
critic would argue that the denotation of a derived expression must be a function of the
denotations of the parts of the derived expression. Because the name a and the sentence
Rab are not parts of quantified sentence
8R b
the critic insists that one cannot draw conclusions about the denotations of a or Rab from
the denotation of the quantified sentence.
However, the conception of compositionality that appeals to part-hood in this sense
(i.e. parts of derived expressions) is insu ciently general to capture Frege’s approach. The
outputs of Frege’s syntactic theory, the Begri↵sschrift expressions, are (two-dimensional)
arrays of symbols. But, since it may happen that one and the same Begri↵sschrift ex-
pression can be constructed in more than one way, the components of the array do not
reflect the syntactic derivation or semantic evaluation of the expressions that Frege o↵ers.
Moreover, they simply lack su cient structure to calculate their semantic values without
29One such critic might be Wehmeier (2021: 17) who argues that Frege’s deletion operation should not be
counted as a semantic composition rule since it involves removing an expression. On our view, what matters
is that it is a syntactic derivation rule. That is, the formulae of the Begri↵sschrift do not contain as parts all
of the expressions that figure in their syntactic derivations, but compositionality requires us to semantically
evaluate a formula in terms of the expressions that figure in its syntactic derivation.
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appealing to their syntactic derivations.30 To give one example: Frege syntactically derives
a formula that we might represent as ‘8x(x = x)’ by first deriving ‘a = a’ from the dyadic
predicate ‘⇠ = ⇣’ and a name ‘a’. He then removes occurrences of ‘a’ to yield the monadic
predicate ‘⇠ = ⇠’, which is fed into the quantifier ‘8x(. . . x . . . )’, resulting in ‘8x(x = x)’.31
In the resulting formula, it is not clear whether the monadic predicate ‘⇠ = ⇠’, the dyadic
predicate ‘⇠ = ⇣’, or both are present as parts. Thus, it’s not clear how to apply the principle
of compositionality on the basis of the orthographic parts of the formula ‘8x(x = x)’. But
this is not a problem. What matters to the semantic evaluation of a formula is its syntactic
derivation.32
So on the common, general conception of compositionality we are concerned with, the
semantic value of a complex expression need not be determined by the semantic values
of its literal parts and their arrangements (after all, formulae may be Gödel numbers).
Rather, the semantic value of a complex expression is determined by the semantic values
of the expressions from which it is derived and the semantic significance of the derivation
rule. This conception of compositionality is common in contemporary formal semantics
(cf. Pagin & Westerståhl 2010).
The two ways of talking about compositionality are not actually opposed. Rather,
30Note that the fact the the formulae of the Begri↵sschrift are two-dimensional is irrelevant to the point
we are making here. The point is that expressions that figure in the syntactic derivation of a formula are not
recoverable from the output of the derivation.
31See Frege (1893/2013), §30, where Frege o↵ers this exact derivation.
32We are running compositionality on expressions in deference to the Fregeans. However, there is a
conception of compositionality that can restore the connection between part-hood and syntactic derivation
(see Hodges 2001). The semantic value of an expression with structured description D is determined by
the semantic values of the expressions represented by the parts of D. Thus, p⇧( (a,Rab))q is a structured
description of a formula. The parts of this structured description correspond to expressions that occur in the
derivation of the formula it represents. The semantic value of the formula picked out by the description is
determined by the semantic values of the expressions that occur in the derivation of the formula. Thus, this
conception of compositionality connects the meaning of a formula to the parts of its structured description
rather than to the parts of the formula itself. Appealing to this alternative conception of compositionality
does not alter the dialectic of the paper. In particular, appealing to structured descriptions does not allow
the Fregean to claim that they have eliminated variables unless they have also eliminated variables from the
structured descriptions. Thanks to an anonymous referee for Ergo for pointing out this alternative.
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the conception of compositionality in terms of the parts of an expression agrees with
the derivational conception of compositionality, whenever the parts of an expression
mirror its syntactic derivation. Thus, the part-whole conception of compositionality is
a special case of the general, derivational conception of compositionality. Its range of
application is restricted to languages where the output formula has constituents that do
match its derivation.33 Evaluated by the standard of compositionality appropriate to
Frege’s syntactic theory of Basic Laws §30, we believe—contrary to Dummett, Evans, etc.—
that the Fregean approach does not reconcile compositionalitywith truth and reference
centrality.
4 Contemporary Fregeans: Accepting the Dilemma
We have examined the three elements of the Fregean approach to quantification: F1-F3.
We have argued that none of these elements releases the Fregean from the dilemma faced
by the Tarskian: abandon either truth and reference centrality or compositionality. In
the case of F1, we saw that even if quantifiers are predicates of predicates, the Fregean is
still tasked with constructing complex predicates in the syntactic derivations of quantified
formulae. Standard approaches to this construction invoke Tarskian variables. In the
case of F2, we examined Frege’s proposal that complex predicates result from applying a
syntactic rule to a name and a closed sentence. However, preserving compositionality
required abandoning the doctrine that the denotation of the name is its referent and that
the denotation of the sentence is its truth-value. For F3, we saw that the calligraphic
33Many contemporary semanticists—under the influence of the Katz-Postal hypothesis (Katz & Postal
1964)—do believe that there is a level syntactic representation for natural language satisfying this description.
However, what’s interesting about the Fregean approach is that the assumption is not satisfied, making the
more general, derivational conception of compositionality the appropriate standard. In this respect, the
Fregean approach agrees with contemporary approaches to semantics that likewise disavow a level of LF and
attempt to o↵er a directly compositional semantics for surface forms in terms of their syntactic derivations
(cf. Jacobson 2014).
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presentation of the complex predicate has no impact on the underlying semantic issue,
even if the presentation identifies alphabetic variants.
We now turn to examine contemporary approaches inspired by Frege. Working
through these approaches, we will see that they ultimately accept one or the other horn of
the dilemma. We begin by discussing approaches inspired by Mates (1965) which reject
compositionality. We then turn to discuss the approach of Wehmeier (2018) which rejects
truth and reference centrality. In neither case are the resources deployed somehow
advantageous or more conservative than those deployed by the Tarskian.
4.1 Rejecting compositionality
Frege syntactically analyzes a quantificational statement—which we notate as 8x x—as
deriving from a quantifier 8 and a complex predicate. The complex predicate is derived
by applying a syntactic operation to a name ↵ and sentence  ↵ – Frege would represent
the output of the operation as  ⇠. In Grundgesetze (§31), Frege o↵ers suggestive rules for
determining the denotation of the complex predicate and in turn the quantified statement.
In particular, Frege proposes that 8x x is true if  ⇠ is true for every argument. He then
suggests that  ⇠ is true for every argument if and only if    is true for every name  . Such
passages suggest a substitutional rendering of the abstraction rule and quantification more
broadly. For example, Dummett says that on Frege’s view “[i]n the case of a complex
predicate, the notion of the predicates’ being true or false of an object is derivative from
that of the truth or falsity of the sentence which results from filling the argument place of
the predicate with some name of the object” (Dummett 1973: 405; cf. 521↵, see also Evans
1977 and Heck 2012: 64).
These glosses on Frege’s view have been taken to suggest a substitutional reading
where the clause for quantification (building in abstraction) would be as follows:
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Substitutional Quantification Rule: J8⌫ K=
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if for all names  , J [ /⌫]K = True
False, otherwise.
Although certain passages of Frege point towards such a clause, Frege’s intentions here
have been an issue of controversy (see, e.g., Stevenson 1973).34 Interpreting Frege sub-
stitutionally is in tension with Frege’s insistence that functions have a value for every
possible argument—unless it is assumed that every object has a name (Heck 2012: 56-57;
Dummett 1973: 17-19). We won’t weigh in on the interpretative issue, but it seems clear
that insofar as a Fregean acknowledges unnamed objects they ought not advocate for the
simple substitutional quantification rule.35
Benson Mates’ textbook treatment of first-order logic from the 1960’s develops Frege’s
approach in a modern, model-theoretic setting (Mates 1965); cf. Evans (1977: 473-77),
Bostock (1997: 84-86), and Heck (2012: 53-64). While model-theoretic semantics is absent
from, and possibly even in conflict with, Frege’s own program, contemporary semantic
theories in a Fregean tradition often make use of models.36 A modelM is an interpretation
of the basic expressions of the language. The interpretation of a name ↵ is an individual
M(↵) and the interpretation of an atomic n-ary predicate ⇡ is a set of n-tuples, M(⇡).
Each modelM gives a model-relative denotation function J.KM for every expression of the
language.
Mates o↵ers a simple model-theoretic semantics for the quantifier-free sentences. He
then o↵ers recursive truth conditions of quantified sentences based on the interpretations
assigned ultimately to the quantifier-free sentences. The approach is broadly Fregean
34See also Heck (1997), Heck (2012: 53-64), Boolos (1998: 225-227), and Dummett (1973: 521-528).
35Boolos et al. (2007) go so far as to call the substitutional clause above “a simple, tempting, and wrong
approach to defining truth for the case of quantification” (116).
36See Blanchette (2012) and surrounding literature on the Frege-Hilbert Controversy, e.g. Doherty (2017)
and references therein.
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because the semantic evaluation of quantified sentences reduces to the semantic evaluation
of closed sentences rather open sentences. It thus appears that these approaches “run their
recursion directly on truth” (Evans 1977: 475) and thereby preserve truth and reference
centrality.
Mates’ treatment of predicate logic has a standard Tarskian syntax with variables,
where quantifiers, such as ‘8x’, are sentential connectives (see §2). Yet, unlike Tarski,
Mates does not appeal to variable assignments in the definition of truth for quantified
sentences. In fact, Mates’ semantics doesn’t interpret the variables and open sentences
at all. Instead, Mates’ strategy provides the semantics of quantified sentences via the
reinterpretation of names and closed sentences. The semantics of the quantified sentences
are given in terms of reinterpretations of certain quantifier-free sentences. Namely, those
that are related to the (open) formulae embedded under the quantifier by substitution of a
name for the occurrences of a variable (see Mates 1965: 54-63). This is carried out in terms
of what Mates calls  -variant models:
Definition. A modelM is a  -variant ofM0 i↵M andM0 di↵er at most in what
they assign to the name  .
Given the notion of a  -variant model, a quantified sentence 8⌫  is true in a model M if
and only if for the first name   that doesn’t occur in   the sentence  [ /⌫] is true in every
 -variant modelM0. Or to keep in line with the notation we have been employing, where
  is the first name that doesn’t occur in  , Mates’ rule is as follows:
Mates’ Rule: J8⌫ KM =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
True, if for all o, J [ /⌫]KM[ /o] = True
False, otherwise.
Although this semantics may lay claim to preserving truth and reference centrality, it
obviously fails to preserve compositionality. In particular, the semantic evaluation of a
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quantified sentence such as 8xRxa does not proceed by way of the denotation of Rxa from
which it is derived. Indeed, this formula is given no interpretation in the model.37
While Mates’ particular implementation of his approach is obviously non-compositional,
perhaps the appeal to model relativity can be used to restore compositionality.38 Maybe
Mates went wrong by assuming that quantified sentences are syntactically derived along
Tarskian lines from variables and open sentences while he proposed to semantically eval-
uate them in terms of related closed sentences. The Fregean syntactic strategies discussed
above based on F1, F2, and F3, might aid us in rehabilitating the Fregean semantics.
This approach analyses a quantified sentence as derived from a quantifier 8 and a
complex predicate ↵̂ . The complex predicate ↵̂  syntactically derives from an abstraction
rule applied to name ↵ and closed sentence  . A semantic approach similar to that o↵ered
by Mates could be developed to o↵er a model-relative interpretation of the complex
predicate ↵̂  in terms of model-relative interpretations of the closed sentence  . The
model-relative denotation of a predicate abstract ↵̂  is the function that takes an object o
and returns true if and only if   is true relative to a modelM[↵/o] di↵ering fromM only
by assigning object o to the name ↵.
Model-Relative Abstraction Rule: J↵̂ KM =  o.J KM[↵/o]
This semantic clause recursively assigns denotations to all predicate abstracts relative to
a model in terms of model relative denotations of the basic expressions. One might hope
that there is no di culty in preserving compositionality while holding onto truth and
reference centrality.
37This is a key feature shared with substitutional quantification (see Kripke 1976: 330).
38There are slight variants to Mates’ approach that appeal to “auxiliary names” or extensions of the language
such as Heck (2012: 275-282), which are also not compositional. Button and Walsh (2018: 15-19) develop a
Mates-style approach that “seems to provide a truly compositional notion of meaning” (21). However, all they
mean by this is that the semantic clause to construct a quantified sentence from a quantifier and a complex
predicate is compositional. They do not o↵er a compositional semantics for complex predicates.
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Closer inspection dashes this hope. Since we have introduced explicit model relativity,
we must talk in terms of the model-relativized versions of the principles at play in the
dilemma.
model-relative truth and reference centrality: The denotation in a model of a
term is an object and the denotation in a model of a sentence is a truth-value.
We must also speak of a language being compositional relative to a model. If the language
is compositional relative to a model, then the denotation of a derived expression relative to
model M is a function of the denotations of the expressions from which it is immediately
derived relative to modelM. Thus, where ⌘ is a syntactic rule, compositionality relative to
a model says the following:
model-relative compositionality:
If ↵ = ⌘( 1,. . .  n) and   = ⌘( 1,. . .  n), then if J iKM = J iKM (for all i),
then J↵KM = J KM.
If the Fregean semantics on o↵er accepts model-relative truth and reference cen-
trality, it violates model-relative compositionality. To see this compare the model
relative denotations of the two abstracts considered above, âRab and âRba. These have
di↵erent model-relative denotations according to the present Fregean semantics, as can be
seen from (i).
(i) JâRabKM =  o.JRabKM[a/o] ,  o.JRbaKM[a/o] = JâRbaKM
But supposing thatM(a) =M(b), it would follow that (ii).
(ii) JRabKM = JRbaKM
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Thus, âRab and âRba di↵er only by the substitution of expressions—Rab and Rba—with
the same model-relative denotation. Even when placed in the model-theoretic setting, the
Fregean still faces the choice between truth and reference centralityon the one hand and
compositionality on the other—when those are stated in the appropriate model-relative
way.
4.2 Rejecting truth and reference centrality
We have argued that neither Mates’  -variant approach nor model-theoretic approaches
which might look to Mates for their inspiration allows the Fregean to preserve composi-
tionality. Some Fregeans regard this cost as too high. For example, Wehmeier (2018)
acknowledges that “[t]he principal challenge in developing Fregean predicate logic is the
construction of a compositional semantics” (214).
To o↵er a compositional Fregean semantics, Wehmeier shifts his semantic perspective.
Rather than o↵ering a denotation relative to a model M, Wehmeier o↵ers an absolute,
but model-sensitive, denotation for every expression of the language. Thus, an atomic
predication Rab will not receive a separate denotation JRabKM for each modelM. Instead,
the denotation of the sentence will be a function which takes a model M as input and
outputs the truth-value of the sentence on that model.
These model-sensitive denotations allow Wehmeier to retain compositionality even
for the hard case of predicate abstraction. The denotation of a complex predicate âRab
depends on the referent of a and truth-value of Rab relative to a range of other models. For
any modelM, the denotation of âRab is true onM of an object o if and only if Rab is true
relative to a model that di↵ers fromM only by assigning a to the object o. In symbols,
Fregean Abstraction Rule: J↵̂ K =  M. o.J K(M[↵/o])
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Since the semantics is given in terms of the richer model-sensitive values, the counterex-
amples to compositionality above will be blocked.
While Wehmeier’s semantics is compositional, it flagrantly violates truth and ref-
erence centrality. Rather than o↵ering truth-values as the denotations of sentences
and objects as the denotations of names, Wehmeier o↵ers functions from models onto
truth-values and onto objects, respectively.
. . . the Fregean meanings we are about to construct will . . . be functions defined on the
class of all models; indeed, the Fregean meaning. . . of any linguistic item s is going
to be the function that maps any modelM to the reference JsKM of s inM. (Wehmeier
2018: 224)
For example, the denotation of a name a will be the function that maps a model M to
the value of a in that model. In symbols: JaK =  M.M(a). The denotation of a sentence
will be a function from models to truth-values. The denotation of a name, then, will
clearly not be an object, and the denotation of a sentence will not be a truth-value. More-
over, Wehmeier explicitly accepts the consequence that distinct names never have the same
denotation (Wehmeier 2018: 234).39
Wehmeier is correct that one can retain compositionality by abandoning truth and
reference centrality. Indeed, that is what the Tarskians have done (cf. §2.2) by treating
the denotation of a term as a function from assignments to objects and the denotation
of a sentence as a function from assignments into truth-values. Comparing the semantic
clauses for predicate abstraction on each approach, the di↵erence appears to lie (i) in the
39Wehmeier (2018; 2021) insists that his Fregean approach is compositional, while, in contrast to the Tarskian
approach, employs an ontology where the types “all live in the extensional type hierarchy”. This cannot be
maintained. But, Wehmeier is clear that the theory is not compositional in terms of these extensional types –
instead compositionality reigns at the level of “Fregean intensions” (i.e. functions from models to extensions
in models) – so he is explicity denying truth and reference centrality.
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appeal to letters from the earlier half of the alphabet rather than the latter half and (ii) in
the substitution ofM for  .
Fregean Abstraction Rule: J↵̂ K =  M. o.J K(M[↵/o])
Tarskian Abstraction Rule: J⌫̂ K =   . o.J K( [⌫/o])
Wehmeier’s clause for predicate abstraction seems to us to be no more than a typographic
variant of the Tarskian. A model M is an assignment function written in Gothic script.
Thus, the model shifting approach should be construed as a form of variabilism, as dis-
cussed above.
Wehmeier (2018: 247) argues that his proposal is a more conservative rejection of
truth and reference centrality. He points out that in the model-theoretic setting every
approach, whether Fregean or Tarskian, involves “a dependency of meanings on mod-
els”. He argues that the denotation of an expression must be model sensitive in order
to di↵erentiate the meanings of the sentences 8xPx and 9xPx, where P is empty. The
crucial di↵erence between models and assignment functions for Wehmeier is that models
reinterpret the predicate constants whereas assignment functions do not. Thus, 8xPx and
9xPx will be true in di↵erent models and will not have the same model-sensitive meaning.
Wehmeier is correct that in classical presentations of Tarskian predicate logic, an as-
signment function reinterprets only the individual variables and not the upper case letters
that act as predicates. However, the reason assignment functions do not reinterpret the
predicates in these presentation of Tarskian first-order logic is that the logic is first-order.
In particular, there is no binding of predicate variables. By way of contrast, standard pre-
sentations of second-order logic—for instance, Shapiro (1991: 72)—do allow assignment
functions to interpret predicate letters. Assignments—so construed—can do all of the
theoretical work that Wehmeier assigns to models. This is perhaps why Tarski himself
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appeals to assignment functions in his early definition of logical consequence.40 Nothing
prohibits one from saying with Tarski (1936/1983) that models are assignments functions. A
model is an assignment function that reinterprets not only the terms but also the predicate
letters. Thus, there is no need to introduce both assignment and model sensitivity and
Wehmeier’s semantics is not more conservative than Tarski’s.
5 Conclusion
While the Tarskian approach to quantification, with its explicit use of variables, faces a
number of standard objections, we’ve argued that, despite appearances to the contrary,
the Fregean approach is open to the exact same objections. Insofar as the Fregean can o↵er
a compositional semantic treatment of quantification they – like the Tarskian – must rely
on variables. In fact, we have argued that developing a fully compositional semantics in
the tradition of Frege leads to variabilism: the view that names are variables.
It is worth noting that these results have significant consequences for our understand-
ing of Frege’s puzzle (Frege 1892/1960). Assuming compositionality, Frege argued that if
two names such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ denote the same thing, then the sentences
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ co-denote as well. Frege found this
puzzling because the two sentences have di↵erent cognitive values. He therefore posited
that expressions have senses in addition to their customary denotations. Although ‘Hes-
perus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ agree in denotation, they di↵er in sense, as do the sentences
‘Hesperus is Hesperus’ and ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’. But given our arguments above,
Frege’s theory of quantification already forces a choice: either the denotations of ‘Hespe-
rus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ di↵er in order to provide a compositional account of quantification
40See Etchemendy (1988a) and Etchemendy (1988b). Of course without varying the domain of quantification
a sentence such as 9x9y(x , y) would come out as a logical truth. See Garcı́a-Carpintero (1992).
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or the denotation of a sentence is not a function of the denotations of the names. There-
fore, the need to reject either truth and reference centrality or compositionality to save
Fregean theories of quantification undermines the argument for the introduction of sense.
An outstanding issue is that names do not substitute salva veritate under a belief report.
Frege’s response is to introduce the doctrine of “reference shift”: expressions embedded
under belief ascriptions denote their customary senses rather than their customary refer-
ents.41 However, the results of this paper open up another possibility: the belief operator
could be sensitive to the semantic di↵erence between proper names needed to account for
the theory of quantification. This solution would bring the Fregean theory of quantifica-
tion fully in line with recent variabilists who treat proper names as Tarskian variables. On
these approaches, distinct proper names have di↵erent denotations. Substitution failures
in belief ascriptions can be accounted for if the belief operator is sensitive to this di↵erence
in denotations.42
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Grimm, José. 2013. Implementation of Bourbaki’s Elements of Mathematics in Coq: Part One,
Theory of Sets. Research Report RR-6999. INRIA.
Heck, Richard Kimberly. 1997. Grundgesetze der Arithmetik I §§29–32. Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic, 38(3), 437–474. (originally published under the name “Richard G. Heck,
Jr”).
Heck, Richard Kimberly. 2012. Reading Frege’s Grundgesetze. Oxford University Press.
(originally published under the name “Richard G. Heck, Jr”).
Heim, Irene, & Kratzer, Angelika. 1998. Semantics in Generative Grammar. Blackwell
Publishers.
Henkin, L., Monk, J. D., & Tarski, A. 1971. Cylindric Algebras: Part I. North-Holland,
Amsterdam. Volume 37.
Hodges, Wilfrid. 2001. Formal Features of Compositionality. Journal of Logic, Language and
Information, 10(1), 7–28.
Hodges, Wilfrid. 2014. Tarski’s Truth Definitions. In: Zalta, Edward N. (ed), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, fall 2014 edn. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Hunter, Geo↵rey. 1971. Metalogic: An Introduction to the Metatheory of Standard First Order
Logic. Berkeley: University of California Press.
45
Jacobson, Pauline. 1999. Towards a variable-free semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy,
22(2), 117–185.
Jacobson, Pauline. 2014. Compositional Semantics: An Introduction to the Syntax/Semantics
Interface. Oxford University Press.
Janssen, T.M.V. 1997. Compositionality. In: van Benthem, J., & ter Meulen, A. (eds),
Handbook of Logic and Language. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Janssen, T.M.V. 2001. Frege, Contextuality and Compositionality. Journal of Logic, Language
and Information, 10(1), 115–136.
Kalish, Donald, & Montague, Richard. 1964. Logic: Techniques of Formal Reasoning. Oxford
University Press.
Kaplan, David. 1986. Opacity. Pages 229–289 of: Hahn, Lewis Edwin, & Schilpp,
Paul Arthur (eds), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine. Open Court.
Katz, Jerrold, & Postal, Paul. 1964. An Intergrated Theory of Linguistic Description. The MIT
Press: Cambridge, Mass.
King, Je↵rey C. 2003. Tense, Modality, and Semantic Values. Philosophical Perspectives,
17(1), 195–246.
King, Je↵rey C. 2007. The Nature and Structure of Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kobele, Gregory M. 2010. Inverse linking via function composition. Natural Language
Semantics, 18(2), 183–196.
Kripke, Saul A. 1976. Is There a Problem About Substitutional Quantification? Pages 324–
419 of: Evans, Gareth, & McDowell, John (eds), Truth and Meaning. Oxford University
Press.
46
Larson, R., & Segal, G. 1995. Knowledge of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Theory. MIT
Press.
Lewis, David. 1970. General semantics. Synthese, 22(1), 18–67.
Lewis, David. 1974. ’Tensions. Pages 49–61 of: Munitz, Milton K., & Unger, Peter K. (eds),
Semantics and Philosophy. New York University Press.
Lewis, David. 1980. Index, context and content. Pages 79–100 of: Kanger, S., & Ohman, S.
(eds), Philosophy and Grammar. Amsterdam: Reidel.
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